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The recent decision of the High Court in Gregson v HAE Trustees Ltd & 
Ors1 (“Gregson”) represents a low point for the potential sustainability of 
what has become known as a dog-leg claim,2 a hitherto rarely utilised cause 
of action. The essence of the dog-leg claim is this. When a trust suffers loss as 
a result of a breach by a corporate trustee, and that corporate trustee cannot or 
will not pursue its own directors to recover the losses to the settlement, a dog-
leg claim recognises the right of action available to the corporate trustee as 
being the property of the trust. In the event that the corporate trustee fails to 
pursue its directors the beneficiaries may do so because the claim belongs to 
the trust. 
Given that the dog-leg claim has formed the basis of the claim in only a 
handful of cases there is very limited authority to which reference can be 
made, some of which emanates from other jurisdictions such as Australia and 
Jersey. This commentary will examine more closely the nature of the dog-leg 
claim, the circumstances in which such a claim might potentially arise and the 
impact of the limited judicial decisions in this context. It then goes on to 
consider whether the court’s lack of enthusiasm for such a cause of action has 
secured protection for the directors of corporate trustees, enabling them to 
hide behind the corporate veil, in a context where the justification for such 
protection may be open to question. 
 
GREGSON – THE FACTS 
 
Gregson concerned a trust of shares in a family company, the well known 
furniture chain, Courts plc, a business which was acquired and built up by 
members of the Cohen family. HAE Trustees Ltd (“HAE”) is a corporate 
* LLB (Hons), BCL (Oxon), Barrister (Harcourt Chambers - Temple, London & 
Oxford), Lecturer in Law, University of Buckingham. 
1 [2008] EWHC 1006 (Ch). 
2 Ibid, at para [9]. 
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trustee which was incorporated in 19603 for the purpose of acting as trustee4 
to a number of family settlements, including the one the subject of this claim. 
The whole of the property of the trust with which this claim was concerned 
consisted of Courts shares, transferred by the settlor, Henry Cohen, to HAE 
shortly after the settlement was created. HAE retained the shares from the 
time they were settled. The claimant is a beneficiary under the discretionary 
settlement by virtue of an appointment made in 1991, her entitlement being 
just over 25% of its value. She is also a member of the Cohen family. On 30 
November 2004 Courts went into administration, the company having become 
insolvent with a deficiency of some £70 million. The property of the trust 
became, to all intents and purposes, worthless. 
 
THE CLAIM AND THE DEFENDANTS’ APPLICATION  
 
The claim was brought against HAE, the first defendant, and its directors, 
the second to fifth defendants.5 HAE had no assets of its own so whilst it was 
a party to the action in the High Court it played no part in the proceedings. 
The primary targets of the action were the directors of HAE.6  The claim was 
brought on the basis that the directors were liable to HAE for breach of their 
duty of care as directors and the claims which HAE were entitled to bring 
against its directors arising out of these breaches were the property of the 
settlement. It was argued that as HAE would not and could not be expected to 
sue its directors for their breaches the claims could be made by the claimant as 
a beneficiary of the settlement. The basis upon which the claimant alleged that 
the directors had breached their duty of care was their failure to review the 
investments of the settlement and consider diversification pursuant to their 
statutory obligation under section 4(2) of the Trustee Act 2000 (“the 2000 
Act”). 
Following the issue of the claim the second, third and fifth defendants 
made an application for summary judgment or for the claim to be struck out. 
The judge had, therefore, to determine whether the claimant’s claim, firstly, 
that the directors had failed to comply with their statutory obligation under 
section 4(2) of the 2000 Act, and, secondly, that such a claim was the property 
of the settlement, had any real prospect of success.  
3 It was incorporated as a company limited by guarantee and had no share capital. The 
affairs of the company, as prescribed by its Memorandum of Association, were to be 
conducted without the acquisition of any profit or gain. 
4 It also acted as executor or administrator of estates. 
5 The fourth defendant was the personal representative of a deceased director. 
6 The claim against the directors has been described as a “shameless piece of 
defendant shopping”, Richard Nolan “Shopping for Defendants: Worthless Trust 
Companies and their Directors” [2008] 67(3) CLJ 472 at 472. 
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This commentary is largely concerned with the second of these questions, 
namely whether any claim against the directors can be properly described as 
the property of the settlement. The court did find that the statutory duties 
applied to the Courts shares and, thus, that the claim could not have been be 
struck out on that ground. However, unless the dog-leg claim was determined 
to be arguable, thus enabling the claim to go to trial, this was of little comfort 
to the claimant.  
 
THE DOG-LEG CLAIM 
 
The potential for a dog-leg claim arises, as illustrated by the facts of 
Gregson, in the context of corporate trusteeship. A company formed for the 
purposes of acting as a corporate trustee must have directors, as indeed all 
companies must.7 A corporate trustee is, after all, a company and is subject to 
the same statutory regime applicable to any company. The directors of any 
company owe a number of duties to the company including a duty of care.8 
However, whilst the directors of a company owe duties to the company itself, 
can it be said that they owe a duty to anyone else, most particularly the 
beneficiaries of the settlement(s) on whose behalf the company is acting as a 
corporate trustee? According to the Court of Appeal in Bath v Standard Land 
Co Ltd9 the directors of a corporate trustee owe no fiduciary duty to a 
beneficiary of the trust:  
 
“It is of course true that a company acts through its directors. But that 
does not involve the proposition that if a breach of trust is committed 
by a company, acting through its board, a beneficiary can maintain 
any action against the directors in respect of such breach of trust”.10
 
It was argued in Gregson not that the directors owed a duty directly to the 
beneficiaries of the settlements but that the duties owed by the directors to the 
company itself were the property of the settlements for which the company 
acted as trustee. This is the distinction between a claim against the directors 
based upon a breach of duty owed directly to the beneficiaries, which is 
clearly unsustainable in light of the decision in Bath v Standard Land Co Ltd, 
and a claim founded upon the settlement’s ownership of the claim which the 
corporate trustee is entitled to bring against its own directors who have 
breached their duty to the company, but which may, in the alternative, be 
7 Companies Act 2006, s 154(1).  
8 Companies Act 2006, s 174. 
9 [1911] 1 Ch 618 (CA). 
10 Ibid, per Cozens-Hardy MR at 625-626. 
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brought by a beneficiary of the settlement. Thus, the dog-leg claim was said to 
facilitate the indirect enforcement of the duty owed to the company.11
 
DISCUSSION OF THE COURTS’ APPROACH TO THE DOG-
LEG CLAIM 
 
The court in Gregson conducted a thorough review of the authorities, 
including those cases in which a dog-leg claim had been expressly pleaded 
and that authority which, despite such a claim having not been pleaded, was 
said to offer support for the proposition that a right of action against the 
directors of a corporate trustee was the property of the settlement. 
 
(a) Authorities where a dog-leg claim was expressly pleaded 
 
A relatively recent Australian decision of the Victorian Court of Appeal, 
Young v Murphy,12 was concerned with a dog-leg claim. A trustee company, 
BTPC, had been replaced as trustee of a number of investment trusts. BTPC 
went into liquidation. The new trustees sought to sue not only BTPC but, inter 
alia, its directors. During a close examination of the dog-leg claim which was 
expressly pleaded in that case, Phillips J, rejecting the dog-leg claim, stated: 
 
“The business activity of BPTC as trustee of these trusts was itself the 
framework within which the directors came to perform the duties 
which they owed to the company by virtue of their office as director; 
but the duties which were owed are none the less general duties and 
are not owed to the company in some specific role or character, or at 
least they are not owed to the company in some specific role or 
character when the duties are alleged to have arisen only in virtue of 
the office which is held… 
 
It follows that if there be a breach by the directors of the duties which 
they did owe to the company, being the former trustee BPTC, and if 
the company was thereby damnified, BPTC might have a right of 
action against the directors for breach of their duties. In so far as those 
duties were founded in the common law, there might be a right of 
damages and, if they be fiduciary duties, there might be a right to 
equitable compensation. Either way, it is the company in which the 
right of action is vested. The plaintiffs [the new trustees] now claim to 
have succeeded to that right of action by virtue of their appointment as 
11 [2008] EWHC 1006 (Ch), at para [45]. 
12 [1996] 1 VR 279. 
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new trustees, but by what right can that be so? The right of action held 
by the former trustee cannot be shown to have been trust property; 
there is no basis upon which to conclude it was…the directors cannot 
be said on the pleading in this case to have owed their duties to the 
company only in relation to some particular trust or trusts; nor were 
those duties imposed upon them in relation to some particular item or 
items of trust property as such. Rather the existence of both the trusts 
and the trust property was but the context in which the duties fell to be 
discharged by those who owed duties to the company generally as its 
officers. There is no basis then, for supposing that the right of action 
was trust property in the hands of BPTC or for supposing that the right 
of action passed to the new trustees, upon their appointment as such. 
 
On that basis, it follows that any right of action against the former 
directors for breaches of duties said to have been owed to BPTC 
remains with that company. The company is now in liquidation and so 
it is a matter for the liquidator whether to pursue the directors for 
those alleged breaches of duty. Whether he could be persuaded to 
bring such proceedings (perhaps, if indemnified as to costs) is a matter 
which does not fall for decision. But the benefit of such proceedings 
will belong to the creditors generally, in the liquidation, consistently 
with my view that the directors owe their duty to BPTC and not to 
BPTC in a particular capacity.”13
 
The decision in Young v Murphy,14 whilst not binding, is entirely 
consistent with the English company law principle that a company director 
owes a duty to the company,15 no-one else.16 In light of this recognition is 
there any authority which does offer support for the concept of the dog-leg 
claim? It is sparse but does, however, exist.17  
Limited support for the possibility of such a claim can be derived from the 
decision of Lindsay J in HR v JAPT.18 This was an application by the third of 
six defendants for the claimant’s claim to be struck out on the ground that the 
claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action against him. The claimants in 
the action were the present trustees and a beneficiary of a company pension 
13 Ibid, at 302. 
14 [1996] 1 VR 279. 
15 This is repeated in Companies Act 2006, s 170(1), which provides that the statutory 
duties owed by a director are owed to the company. 
16 Eg shareholders or employees. 
17 The extent to which such a claim is limited is acknowledged in Lewin on Trusts 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 18th edn, 2007) paras 40-51. 
18 [1997] OPLR 123. 
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scheme. The third defendant was a director of the former corporate trustee. 
The claim was concerned with losses to the scheme which ran to several 
million pounds as a result, it was alleged, of various acts of mismanagement 
by the former corporate trustee. One of the grounds of claim was that the third 
defendant owed a duty to the former trustee,19 that he breached that duty, that 
the former corporate trustee thereby suffered loss (in that it was obliged to 
make good a deficit to the scheme) and that the chose in action against the 
third defendant thus acquired by the former corporate trustee was trust 
property which, by succession, passed to and could be sued upon by the 
present trustees. After reviewing the authorities, including Young v Murphy, 
Lindsay J concluded that he was not prepared to describe the claimant’s dog-
leg claim as unarguable.  
This stance is clearly contrary to that which was adopted in Young v 
Murphy in which any suggestion that a right of action against the directors of 
a corporate trustee could belong to anyone other than that particular corporate 
trustee was roundly rejected. However, the apparently less strict approach 
adopted in HR v JAPT20 was, according to Lindsay J, justified on the 
particular facts of the case. In contrast with the factual circumstances in 
Young v Murphy this case concerned the liability of, inter alia, a director of a 
one-trust corporate trustee thereby, in Lindsay J’s view, making the case for 
the claimant stronger. This is because a one-trust corporate trustee has only 
one trust to administer, hence it has no responsibility for anything but the 
administration of that one trust. In this context there is arguably a much 
stronger connection between the corporate trustee, its directors and the trust.  
The decision in HR v JAPT was, admittedly, simply a refusal to strike out 
the claimant’s claim; not a decision on the merits. However, the fact that the 
dog-leg claim was considered arguable, in the context in which it arose in HR 
v JAPT, is sufficient to indicate that there may be circumstances in which 
such a claim might be sustainable. 
The recent case of Alhamrani v Alhamrani,21 a decision of the Royal 
Court of Jersey, is also instructive. The dog-leg point arose in the context of 
an application for leave to amend pleadings in order to introduce the claim. In 
refusing the application Commissioner Page said:22
 
“33. Mr Taylor conceded, as he had to, that if the pleaded dog leg 
claim is valid in the present case it will apply equally to any director 
of any corporate trustee company whose negligence results in loss to 
the trust fund and consequential liability on the part of the company, 
19 It was claimed that the duty was owed both in tort and as a fiduciary duty. 
20 [1997] OPLR 123. 
21 [2007] JRC 026. 
22 At paras [33] and [34] of his judgment. 
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irrespective of the state of that company’s business, the possibility of 
such liability being satisfied from its own resources or those of its 
insurers, or any other circumstance. 
 
34. But the notion that the right to performance of the standard 
statutory duties owed by a director to his company (as it is put in the 
first party’s pleading) or the duty of a director not to cause loss to his 
company or the company’s cause of action arising from breach of any 
such duty (as it is put elsewhere) is, in the ordinary way to be regarded 
in law as the “asset” or “property” of the trust of which the company 
is trustee, seems to have a degree of artificiality and awkwardness 
about it that is not easy to accommodate – at least in circumstances 
which are not such that the imperatives of justice leave no other 
alternative….”23
 
Following consideration of this decision in Gregson it was noted that 
Jersey previously had legislation24 which made the directors of a corporate 
trustee guarantors of the damages awarded by the Court against the corporate 
trustee for breach of trust, thereby making provision for the payment of 
damages in the event that the corporate trustee was unable to meet such 
claims. However, that provision was repealed in 2006 and has not been 
replaced, thereby providing far more extensive protection for the directors of 
corporate trustees. 
The force of these authorities is self evident, there being only negligible 
support for the dog-leg claim from HR v JAPT. However, the court in 
Gregson was taken to further authority which counsel for the claimant argued 
was helpful. 
 
(b) Potentially relevant authority where a dog-leg claim was not expressly 
pleaded  
 
In Gregson as well as having been referred to cases in which a dog-leg 
claim had been expressly pleaded the court was also directed to the dictum of 
Lord Nicholls in Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Philip Tan Kok Ming25 
(“Royal Brunei”) where he said: 
 
“It is against this background that the question of negligence is to be 
addressed. This question, it should be remembered, is directed at 
whether an honest third party who receives no trust property should be 
23 Reproduced in Gregson at para [40]. 
24 Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984, Art 56. 
25 [1995] 2 AC 378. 
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liable if he procures or assists in a breach of trust of which he would 
have become aware had he exercised due diligence. Should he be 
liable to the beneficiaries for the loss they suffer from the breach of 
trust? 
 
The majority of persons falling into this category will be the hosts of 
people who act for trustees in various ways: as advisers, consultants, 
bankers and agents of many kinds. This category also includes officers 
and employees of companies in respect of the application of company 
funds. All these people are accountable to the trustees for their 
conduct. For the most part they will owe the trustees a duty to exercise 
reasonable skill and care. When that is so, the rights flowing from that 
duty form part of the trust property. As such they can be enforced by 
the beneficiaries in a suitable case if the trustees are unable or 
unwilling to do so. That being so, it is difficult to identify a 
compelling reason why, in addition to the duty of skill and care vis-à-
vis the trustees which the third parties have accepted, or which the law 
has imposed upon them, third parties should also owe a duty of care to 
the beneficiaries. They have undertaken work for the trustees. They 
must carry out that work properly. If they fail to do so they will be 
liable to make good the loss suffered by the trustees in consequence, 
This will include, where appropriate, the loss suffered by the trustees, 
being exposed to claims for breach of trust.”26
 
Counsel for the claimant in Gregson relied upon this passage, in particular 
the reference to the category of persons which was described as including 
officers and employees of the company, as authority that claims against the 
officers and employees of a trust company, which would include directors, 
flowing from a breach of their duty were trust property, enforceable, if the 
trustees were unable or unwilling to act, at the suit of the beneficiaries.27 It 
was argued that this passage supported the claimant’s contention that any 
action which HAE may be entitled to bring against its directors for their 
alleged breaches of duty was the property of the trust, thereby enabling the 
beneficiaries to bring that action in the event that the trustee failed to do so.  
Robert Miles QC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, rejected 
this proposition. He did so on the basis that Lord Nicholls’ dictum was not 
restricted to the context of corporate trustees but was concerned with 
companies generally. He also accepted the validity of the submission of 
Counsel for the second and third defendants that Lord Nicholls was speaking 
of the application of company funds, in other words the corporate trustee’s 
26 Ibid, at 391. 
27 Gregson, at para [32]. 
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own funds, rather than the application of the funds of any settlement being 
managed by the corporate trustee. However, he did regard the sentence which 
referred to the inclusion of officers and employees of companies as coming 
within the category of persons who would be accountable to the trustees, any 
corresponding claim being the property of the trust, as being not easy to 
follow, it having the appearance of a parenthetical afterthought. He then 
speculated that it was more likely Lord Nicholls was referring to a case where 
company funds are entrusted by the directors to other officers or employees 
who then misapply it, the company thereby being in a position of beneficiary 
and entitled to bring proceedings to recover their losses.  
With respect, it is not at all clear that this is what Lord Nicholls had in 
mind when making the observations which he did, and to draw this conclusion 
requires something more to be read into the passage than is evident on a plain 
reading of it. However, Counsel for the claimant did, himself, describe the 
reference to officers and employees in the context used as mysterious, which, 
indeed, it is. 
On the application of Royal Brunei to the facts in Gregson it was regarded 
as most significant that the decision concerned a director’s liability as an 
accessory to the trustee’s breach which could only be established if the 
director was shown to be dishonest. In Gregson it was noted that if Lord 
Nicholls had thought that the duties of the defendant, as a director of the 
trustee, were held on trust for the claimant there would, in Royal Brunei, have 
been no need to establish dishonesty in order to establish accessory liability. 
Ergo, in Gregson, in order for the directors to be directly liable to the 
beneficiaries of the trust, on the application of this line of reasoning it would 
be necessary to establish that the directors had been dishonest; there was no 
such allegation. 
 
THE DECISION IN GREGSON 
 
In light of the foregoing, rather unsurprisingly the High Court rejected the 
possibility of the claimant having any real prospect of success in her dog-leg 
claim against the directors of HAE. Therefore the claims against the defendant 
directors were struck out. In view of this latest blow to the sustainability of a 
dog-leg claim it would appear that unless such a claim were brought against 
the directors of a one-trust corporate trustee, thereby bringing itself squarely 
within the HR v JAPT factual matrix, its prospects of success are moreorless 
non-existent. 
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DISCUSSION 
 
The decision in Gregson, rejecting the dog-leg claim, is clearly consistent 
with well established company law principles. These principles limit the 
potential liability of company directors in circumstances where those directors 
have breached their duty to the company, thereby causing loss to a third party, 
and for which loss an action may be brought against the company. However, 
this decision provides little comfort to beneficiaries under a settlement that 
sustains losses through the mismanagement of the property of the settlement 
by the directors of a corporate trustee. The implications are particularly harsh 
where the corporate trustee has no assets of its own. In such circumstances, 
where a loss is sustained by the settlement (invariably as a result of some 
failure or breach on the part of its directors), the beneficiaries will have little 
chance of recovering those losses if the corporate trustee is the only 
prospective defendant.  
As a consequence of this decision it seems the only legitimate way in 
which the claimant could pursue her claim would be highly convoluted. She 
would have to sue the corporate trustee and obtain judgment against it. HAE’s 
inability to meet any prospective judgment, given that it has no assets of its 
own, would enable the claimant to obtain a winding up order. The claimant 
could then get the liquidator to pursue the directors on behalf of the company. 
This would almost certainly require the claimant to indemnify the liquidator 
against the expense of such litigation given that there would be no funds in the 
liquidation from which to discharge such costs. Furthermore, any judgment 
would represent a credit to the general coffers of the corporate trustee and 
would have to be shared with any other creditors. 
Despite the court’s response to the dog-leg claim according with well 
established principles of company law it exposes a significant flaw in the 
protection afforded to beneficiaries under settlements which are managed by 
corporate trustees. Corporate trustees have no obligation to hold insurance; in 
fact, unless insurance is for the benefit of the settlement as opposed to just 
being for the benefit of the trustees in order to indemnify them against claims 
for breach of trust, the payment of insurance premiums out of the settlement is 
not permitted.28 Furthermore, where a corporate trustee has no assets or 
income of its own it inevitably has no means by which to fund the payment of 
insurance premiums.  
The problem of uninsured corporate trustees is less likely to be an issue in 
the context of professional trustee companies who operate commercially and 
will most likely have insurance. However, in the context of corporate trustees 
which are set up to manage settlements on a non-profit making basis and 
28 See Kemble v Hicks [[1999] PLR 287 and NBPF Pension Trustees Limited v 
Warnock-Smith [2008] EWHC 455 (Ch). 
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which have no assets out of which to meet the costs of insuring against claims 
for breach of trust, the impact upon the beneficiaries can be, as we have seen 
in Gregson, of seismic proportions. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The potential injustice to the beneficiary in this context is obvious, the 
context being one in which a corporate trustee is impecunious and unable to 
satisfy any prospective judgment against it. A corporate trustee is not obliged 
to insure itself against claims arising out of its own breach or the breach of its 
directors. Nor is the corporate trustee obliged to bring an action against its 
own errant directors whose breaches have caused loss to the settlement. The 
only way of compelling an action against the directors is, in appropriate 
circumstances, to obtain a winding up order against the corporate trustee and 
get the liquidator to sue the directors, if possible.  
This situation illustrates what may be perceived by some as a lack of 
adequate regulation regarding the extent to which beneficiaries will be 
protected against losses caused by corporate trustees. Admittedly it is not 
inconsistent with many other jurisdictions which do not impose personal 
liability upon the directors for breaches committed by a corporate trustee.29 In 
fact de-regulation such as that which has recently occurred in Jersey suggests 
an inclination towards further protecting the directors of corporate trustees in 
circumstances where it was previously considered appropriate to impose 
liability.30 However, in contrast, Australia has recently introduced legislation 
designed to make directors of corporate trustees personally liable in 
prescribed circumstances,31 demonstrating some recognition that there may be 
circumstances in which the director of a corporate trustee ought to be exposed 
to the possibility of personal liability. 
Whilst the stance towards the concept of the dog-leg claim adopted by the 
courts may be consistent with established company law principles, it has 
worrying implications regarding the exposure to risk of beneficiaries in this 
context and is arguably inconsistent with the protectionist approach normally 
adopted by the courts regarding losses suffered by beneficiaries through the 
fault of others. Whether or not this tension is sufficient to justify the court 
adopting a novel approach to the question of indirect liability of the directors 
of corporate trustees through the dog-leg claim appears to have been answered 
29 None of the offshore jurisdictions impose liability in this context. 
30 Guernsey, like Jersey, has also had and repealed legislation which sought to impose 
personal liability on the directors of corporate trustees in the event of a breach of 
trust; Trusts (Guernsey) Law 2007. 
31 Corporations Act 2001, s 197. For a slightly fuller discussion of this provisions see 
Halsbury’s Laws of Australia [430-5300]. 
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in the negative. The introduction of legislative protection, either imposing 
personal liability upon the directors or requiring those acting as corporate 
trustees to insure against liability for breach of trust, would appear to be the 
only tenable solution for better protecting the beneficiaries of settlements 
which are mismanaged by corporate trustees and who do not have sufficient 
assets to discharge liabilities which arise out of a breach of trust.  
